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by Klaus-Werner Schatz, Joachim Scheide and Peter Trapp
• The stock market crash of October 1987 was not followed by the widely-feared recession in the
world economy. Most forecasts have been revised upward again, and many are even more
favorable than before the crash. This is also the case for Western European countries. However,
beyond the very short run, there are serious cyclical risks.
• In the 1980s, the economic performance of Western European countries in terms of real GNP
growth has been weaker than in previous decades, and unemployment is now more than twice
as high as it was ten years ago. These developments are due to the poor performance of busi-
ness investment. Rising labor costs have prevented employment and, hence, potential output
from growing faster. This sharply contrasts with conditions in the United States and Japan.
• If the growth of potential output is to be increased, the rentability of investment and the flexibility
in the labor market must be strengthened. As case studies for West Germany show, regulations,
high minimum wages, wage costs and unemployment benefits have contributed to the long-
term rise in unemployment. Therefore, demand stimulation will not induce faster growth and
more employment. In the past 25 years, the acceptance of more inflation has not led to a lasting
reduction of unemployment. Only a more market-oriented strategy can go to the root of the
problem.
• An important prerequisite for a stable economic development is that monetary policy in indu-
strial countries returns to a path compatible with price level stability. Monetary aggregates are
still the most reliable anchor; alternative strategies for monetary policy — targeting interest
rates, exchange rates or commodity prices — may well increase instability in industrial coun-
tries. Also, international coordination of macroeconomic policies is not necessary and may even
be harmful if policymakers rely on wrong models. Given the failures of several attempts to coor-
dinate (the locomotive strategy or the Louvre accord), industrial countries would fare better if
they relied on sound policies at home rather than pointing toward mistakes of other countries.
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ISSN 0455-0420I. The Present Situation and the Outlook
7. Economic Development after the Crash: Has the Outlook Really Deteriorated?
In spring 1988, it is obvious that the crash in the financial markets of October
1987 was not the beginning of the then widely-feared recession or even depression
in the world economy. Industrial production has continued to expand (Graph 1),
and overall demand has risen substantially. Above all, in contrast to the expec-
tations of many observers, private consumption demand has not declined in the in-
dustrial countries. The United States are the only exception: private consumption
and business investment decreased, and the expansion of domestic demand in the
fourth quarter of 1987 was due to the increase of business inventories and to gov-
ernment purchases. Yet, the weakness was only partially affected by the crash.
Both, consumption and investment behave very erratically from quarter to quarter.
In addition, consumption started to decrease already in September, when car sales
weakened after having been boosted by sales promotion actions in July and
August. In recent months, private consumption has strengthened significantly. On
the whole, the underlying upward tendency of economic activity seems to be ba-
sically unchanged in the industrial countries after the fall in stock prices. In
1987, gross national product (GNP) expanded in the industrial countries by 3
p.c, which is a bit more than in 1986 (2.7 p.c). In Japan, the increase was
almost 4 p.c, exceeding the expansion in 1986 by more than one percentage point
(Table 1). In the United States and in Western Europe, GNP grew by 2.9 p.c. and
2.7 p.c. respectively, which are roughly the same increases as in 1986.
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(a) Percentage changes from previous period at annual rates. - (b) United States, Japan,
Canada, West Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy.
Source: OECD [b; c]; own estimates.2. The Shifts between Domestic and External Demand Continue
In the United States, the shift from domestic to external demand continued during
1987. Higher interest rates dampened the expansion of domestic demand, and, to-
gether with a lower exchange rate of the US dollar, they reduced the increase of
imports. Private consumption rose by only half the increase which would be
observed in 1986. Business investment that had been cut by 10 p.c. one year
earlier expanded slightly as profit expectations improved because of the lower
dollar and lower real wages. For the first time in the current upswing, exports
grew substantially faster than imports. The reduction of the import surplus
accounted for roughly half a percentage point of the expansion of GNP and thus
made up for the lower increase of domestic demand.
In contrast to the United States, Western Europe and Japan's domestic demand was
supporting the economic expansion in 1987, its increase exceeded GNP growth sub-
stantially. In both regions, the central banks conducted decisively expansionary
monetary policies, and in Japan government expenditure programs also stimulated
demand. While in Europe private consumption continued to increase at roughly the
rate as in the previous year, in Japan it expanded significantly faster since the
increase in employment and in real wages together with substantial tax cuts led to
a more rapid rise of disposable income of private households. In Western Europe,
it was mainly private consumption which supported the increase of production,
whereas in Japan residential as well as nonresidential investment accelerated,
partly because of improved profit expectations, partly because of lower interest
rates and higher incomes.
Because of the strong domestic demand and the appreciation of their currencies,
imports of the European countries and of Japan rose more rapidly than exports.
For Japan and West Germany, a significant reduction of the current account sur-
plus can be predicted; in a number of Western European countries (e.g., the
United Kingdom, France and Italy), the current account is now in deficit.
In the United States and in Western Europe, as well as in Japan, the current up-
swing started with a recovery of domestic demand (Graph 2). In the course of the
upswing, domestic demand in Japan and in Western Europe supported the ex-
pansion more and more, while in the United States, after peaking in 1984, its
contribution to GNP growth declined. In contrast to widely accepted opinions, theGraph 2 - Contribution of Domestic Demand and Net-Exports to GNP-Growth, 1975-
1987 (a)
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(a) Change in total domestic demand and net-exports in percent of previous period's real GNP. -
(b) Constant prices, seasonally adjusted. - (c) Second half 1987estimated.
Source: OECD [ c]; own estimates.
upswing in Japan and Western Europe was not due above all to strong export over
import growth. Up to 1986, net exports never contributed more than one per-
centage point to GNP growth in Japan, and in Western Europe even barely more
than half a percentage point. In 1986 and in 1987, net exports even dampened the
increase of GNP. For the United States, the numbers seem to suggest that re-ducing domestic absorption is inevitable for lowering the current account deficit.
When total domestic demand rose rapidly in 1983, net exports immediately
worsened, and they improved in the second half of 1984 and in 1985, when
domestic absorption increased less. Also, in the following years, the changes in
the expansion rate of internal demand are clearly reflected in the net-export
performance of the United States.
The strong increases of domestic demand and of imports compared to exports in
the initial years of the upswing in the United States did not contribute very
strongly to the expansion in Japan and Western Europe; as the graph shows, net
exports of Japan and Western Europe remained fairly stable. They turned from
supporting GNP growth, to dampening it when internal demand in Japan and the
European countries tended to increase faster. Of course, the strong fall of the
dollar since the beginning of 1985 may have strengthened these developments, but
it seems not to have been decisive in this respect. The current upswing is sup-
ported by the same factors as the previous upswing.
All these observations suggest that GNP expansion in Japan and Western Europe
will not be dampened if the United States want to cut their current account deficit
through faster export and slower import expansion. In order to assure that the
upswing continues, it is important, however, that they can maintain or speed up
the increase of domestic demand by measures that improve the prospects for long-
term growth. Given the experiences, this will also mean faster import than export
growth, and rapid reductions of current account surpluses or, in a number of
countries, increasing deficits. Most central banks and governments, however, tend
to be mercantilist, preferring surpluses over deficits, as the present discussion
and the experiences at the end of the 1970s exhibit. At that time, a number of
central banks initially reduced money supply growth and raised interest rates not
for fears of increasing inflation, but in order to stem against the reduction of the
current account surplus.
3. The Forecasts: Are There Risks of Recession?
Practically all available forecasts suggest that the recovery in Vlestern Europe will
continue. Compared to the predictions published in last October - i.e., the fore-casts right before the crash - there is no significant downward revision. In
several cases, the 1987 GNP growth was higher than forecast; obviously, the latter
part of 1987 was a surprise to many observers. This is true for individual
countries (Table 2), but also for the forecasts of world trade and GNP in the
whole OECD area. Yet, most institutions still forecast slightly lower growth rates
of GNP for this year than for 1987, and the deceleration is very pronounced for
the United Kingdom and Spain, where the increase in GNP was exceptionally high.
In recent months, we have generally been able to observe the tendency to revise
the forecasts upward also for this year, because 1988 started surprisingly well in
most countries. For example, in the recent joint economic report of the five leading
institutes in West Germany a 2 p.c. increase of real GNP is forecast as opposed to
1.5 p.c. right after the crash.















































































There also seems to be more optimism with respect to inflation; i.e., many fore-
casts now point to lower inflation rates - in terms of the CPI - than half a year
ago. This certainly has to do with the renewed weakness of oil prices: while in
October, most institutes expected an increase in 1988, the outlook is now for a
lower average of this year's oil prices.
The rather low inflation forecasts indicate, too, that cyclical tensions are not
considered to be very likely in the course of 1988. The recovery will continue in
its sixth year, but the growth rates are still quite low if compared to previous up-
swings, especially for most countries in Western Europe, where the upward trendof overall output became increasingly flatter since the early 1970s, and where un-
employment is now more than twice as high as it was in the second half of the
1970s.
II. Slow Growth Ahead: Is the Weakness Cyclical or Is It Supply-Determined?
In spring 1988, the conditions for a continuation of the upswing are viewed to be
favorable. The following reasoning concerning economic policy and economic devel-
opment in the industrial countries seems to be most plausible: demand is stimulated
by expansionary monetary policies (Graph 3); and since January 1988, the
exchange rate of the US dollar which had fallen after the crash in the stock
markets has stabilized again. For the United States, it is important that exports
will continue to rise much faster than imports reflecting the adjustment after the
decline of the dollar. The acceleration of inflation, which most countries have
experienced since the end of 1986 or in the course of 1987, slowed after the crash
in the financial markets. As inflation rates are remaining low at present, monetary
policies are likely to continue the expansionary course for the months to come.
Therefore, the upswing will continue through 1988. Yet, while a recession is im-
probable in the remainder of the year because demand will continue to expand
rapidly, there are no signs for a shift in economic policy, particularly in Europe,
which could promise faster increases in potential output and therefore higher
growth rates in the medium run.
7. Long-Term Development of Capacity, Output, and Employment
While in the short run the change of GNP depends on the development of demand,
the growth of potential output is determined by supply-side factors, as they be-
come manifest in the increase of investment and the number of new jobs. In the
industrial countries together, gross private nonresidential fixed capital formation
which determines the growth of technical production capacities increased somewhat10
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(a) Percentage change over the corresponding period of the
previous year.
Source: OECD [b; c]; own estimates.
less in the years 1982-1987 than in the previous upswing (1975-1980). Between the
regions, however, substantial differences exist (Table 3):
- In the United States, capital formation had grown by 35 p.c. in the years
1975-1980 and, hence, significantly faster than in the industrial countries on
average; in the present upswing it grew by 22 p.c, which is below average.11
Table 3 - Percentage Increase in Business Investment, Gross National Product,
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fixed capital formation. - (b) Standardized un-
average rates in the years 1976-1980 and 1983-
Source: OECD [ c]; own calculations and estimates.
- In Western Europe, the increase was relatively low in both upswings compared to
other regions; yet, there are important exceptions in the present upswing
namely the United Kingdom, Spain, and Denmark.
- In Japan, capital formation attained the average increase of the industrial
countries in the second half of the 1970s. In the present upswing, however,
investment in Japan has outperformed that in the other countries by far.
The numbers seem to suggest that the Japanese economy was the most dynamic
with respect to the response to the challenges posed by competition from newly in-
dustrialized countries, new technologies, and other determinants of structural
change in the world economy.12
In this sense, the US economy presumably has performed worse than the other
countries, as its investment record exhibits. Yet, despite similar low rates of cap-
ital formation, the US economy surpassed the Western European economies by far
with respect to the increase in real GNP. The reason is that employment increased
significantly faster than in Europe (Table 3). This enabled the US economy to ex-
pand the growth of potential output and of GNP beyond the rates of growth of
technical capacities which are determined by capital formation. In addition, labor
productivity grew markedly in the United States in the current upswing, one rea-
son presumably being the increasing shortage of labor, whereas productivity had
practically stagnated in the previous upswing. Since the beginning of the
present upswing, employment has risen by 13 p.c, lately the unemployment rate
was as low as it was in 1974. The labor-force participation rate has risen again
(by 2 points to 66 p.c.) - mainly due to the higher participation of women -
although less than in the second half of the 1970s, when the rate was only 61 p.c.
at the beginning of the upswing.
The US example reveals that slow capital formation must neither mean unemploy-
ment nor restrict the growth of output; what is important is that the supply of
labor is elastic. At the same time, it shows, however, that real labor costs must
decrease, as they did in the United States, if high employment levels are to be
achieved and if insufficient capital formation does not allow for a more rapid in-
crease in labor productivity. In Western Europe, in the current upswing, invest-
ment grew by less than in the United States, and employment increased by only 2
p.c. (compared to 13 p.c), and unemployment remained at levels exceeding those
in the United States and in Japan by far (Table 3 and Graph 4).
In Japan, unemployment has rather steadily increased since the beginning of
the 1970s and doubled up to 1987, as measured by the unemployment rate. Yet,
neither in the recession of 1974/75 nor in that at the beginning of the 1980s did
the unemployment rate rise as dramatically as it did in the other industrial coun-
tries, in particular in Western Europe. With roughly 2.8 p.c at present, the un-
employment rate is also significantly lower than the industrial countries' average of
8.2 p.c or the Western European average of 11 p.c. Together with the high rates
of capital formation, the observations suggest that Japan has been and presumably,
will be able to achieve rapid increases in potential output by making use of its
financial and human resources.13
























(a) France, Italy, United Kingdom, West Germany. - (b) Percent ot total labour force. - (c) Belgium, France, Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom, West Germany. - (d)Estimated.
Source: OECD [a, December 1987]; own calculations and estimates.
2. Capacity Utilization: Have We Reached the Level of 1979/80?
Despite only moderate increases of production, business surveys for most European
countries reveal that at present the degree of capacity utilization in manufacturing
is as high as it had been at the 1979/80 peak. For the European Community (EC)14
as a whole, surveys published by the Commission of the EC even show that the
utilization rate has surpassed the rate at the turn of the decade (Table 4). Hence,
bottlenecks to further production increases exist in many industries. Presumably,
the degrees of capacity utilization are not only high in manufacturing, but come
close to the 1979/80 levels in the European economies in general (see, e.g., the
case for West Germany in Graph 5). Capital formation increased at the same low
pace in the present and in the previous upswing (Table 3). The growth of output
was slightly lower in the 1980s, yet labor productivity advances were lower in the
1980s than in the 1970s. Together with the poor employment record, this means
that there is little scope for faster expansion. This can only be achieved if the
growth rates of capacities and of employment can be substantially raised. There
are idle labor resources which are not utilized because of too high labor costs,
because of labor laws which prevent the dismissal of labor and, hence, its hiring,
and because of numerous other barriers which hinder faster increases of
employment (see also Section III.2 below). As improvements toward more flexibility
in the labor market are hardly discernible, and as there are no signs for faster
capital formation, the growth of potential output will remain low. Hence, what
becomes manifest in slow GNP expansion and high unemployment is basically a me-
dium-term problem on the supply side.
Table 4 - Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing Industry: Survey Results, 1973-





































































Source: Commission of the European Communities [1988, p. 2],
In the United States, it will become increasingly difficult to raise the labor force
participation rate further and to reduce unemployment. Hence, the growth of
employment will be more and more limited by the demographically-determined supply
of labor which expands at an annual rate of about 1.5 p.c. Therefore, bottlenecks15
Graph 5 - Economic Activity in West Germany, 1979-1987
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(a) Change over previous year in p.c. - (b) Own calculation on the basis
of national accounts. - (c) Survey results from the Ifo-Konjunkturtest.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt [var. issues]; Ifo-Institut [var. issues]; own
calculations and estimates.
in the labor market may restrict future growth in the US economy to rates lower
than in the average of the present upswing unless investment increases signifi-
cantly faster than it has done hitherto, which would allow more productivity
growth. In 1986 and 1987 taken together, business investment even stagnated.
Yet, recently there have been some indications for more rapid capital formation. In
contrast to Western Europe and the United States, capital formation in Japan has
significantly accelerated in the 1980s as compared with the second half of the
1970s, although the country exported capital to the rest of the world, running a
huge current account surplus.16
The assigned positive contribution from trade surpluses to GNP growth stems from
a mechanical interpretation of national income accounts statistics as does the
perception that deficits dampen growth. Running a trade deficit simply means that
countries are able to absorb more resources than otherwise and that, by capital
imports, domestic investment can increase faster than domestic saving. If the
United States want to utilize less real and financial resources from abroad, Western
Europe and Japan, which are important suppliers, should seize the opportunity of
absorbing the resources instead and of raising the growth rate of their production
capacities. At present, however, it seems that only Japan is prepared to meet the
opportunities which are offered.
3. Investment Weakness: What Are the Reasons?
Although business profits have improved noticeably in most European countries
since 1983, investment spending has remained disappointingly sluggish and has
hampered the increase of employment. Some observers have argued that, the low
propensity to invest is due to insufficient demand. However, as has been shown
above, demand has recovered over recent years and overall capacity utilization in
most countries is close to the peak levels of 1979/80.
Since profit opportunities provide the main incentive to invest in new capacities, it
seems worthwhile to analyze what contributed to the improvement of profits in
recent years. One observation is that while the profit shares (in GNP) have re-
turned to the high levels prevailing in the early 1970s, the profit rates - total
profits in relation to capital at replacement costs - have hardly increased or have
even declined. This is partly due to the pronounced increase in capital output
ratios in the 1970s. The most striking feature is, however, that revenues not
earned by domestic production activity but by financial investment and direct in-
vestment abroad has increased strongly. The development of profits in West Ger-
many gives an outstanding example of this trend [Dicke, Trapp, 1987]. Whereas
profits earned by production activity (ordinary profits) accounted for two thirds
of total profits in the sixties, they contributed only roughly a quarter in the mid-
1980s (Graph 6). Profits earned in production have even declined in absolute terms
whereas "neutral yields" (interest revenues and extraordinary revenues) have
quadrupled and are now a main source of company income. This process started in17
Graph 6 - Investment Activity and Return on Fixed Assets in West Germany,
1960-1987
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the early 1970s and has continued up to the first half of the 1980s. In 1982, the
ordinary profit share attained a low point, but has increased somewhat since then.
As cyclical factors have contributed to the turnaround, it is too early to judge
whether the increase will be permanent.
The decline of ordinary profits is not in contradiction to the hausse at the stock
exchange from 1983 to 1986. Share prices reflect the expected earnings capacity of
companies as a whole and not only the profitability of domestic production. In fact,
while there was a lasting and marked decline in the ordinary profit rate, the gross
profit rate remained at a fairly high level. This indicates that companies, on
average, have successfully invested in financial assets and in existing or new pro-
duction capacities abroad. Thus, low ordinary profits should not be considered as18
being a problem of individual companies but rather as a problem of the national
economy as a whole. They reflect that West Germany as a production location has
become less attractive to firms. The ratio between the ordinary profit rate and the
real rate of return on financial assets which was clearly above unity in the 1960s
and early 1970s, fell rapidly and was even below unity in the first half of the
1980s. This change in profitability has left its mark on the investment behavior of
firms. The share of net fixed capital in total assets declined from 38 p.c. in the
1960s to 28 p.c in the mid-1980s; the share of financial assets rose corre-
spondingly. Similar trends in company earnings are reported for other European
countries. These developments explain why net corporate investment was extremely
subdued in recent years.
4. Has Inflation Bottomed Out? The Limits to Demand Stimulation
Since the short period of accelerated price increases in the first half of 1987,
inflation rates in industrial countries have stabilized at relatively low levels. The
absence of noticeable inflationary pressures at the beginning of the sixth year of
the upswing has led to the conclusion that there is ample scope for additional de-
mand stimulation. The fact, however, that inflation rates are still down does not
mean that inflation is out. In the past, the lag in the effect of expansionary pol-
icies has been long and variable. In the course of the present upswing, the fall of
the price of oil and of other raw materials, relatively low wage increases, and
fierce competition have helped to extend the period of relatively low inflation.
However, the increase in capacity utilization indicates that supply has not been
expanded at the same rate as demand. Therefore, the danger that inflation will
accelerate if monetary policy remains expansionary is not only a remote possibility
but a very acute threat. It is true that in some countries financial deregulation
has increased the demand for money. But a shift in the demand for money does
not imply that the relation between money supply and price level is no longer exis-
tent and that a permanently high rate of monetary expansion will do no harm to
price level stability. The pronounced increase of domestic demand in Germany, for
example, shows that the economy responds in the traditional way to the acceler-
ation of money supply growth. A continuation of the expansionary stance will
probably add to the inflationary pressures which are already in the pipeline.19
III. No Hope for Lower Unemployment in Europe?
7. Phillips Curves in Industrial Countries: Where Do We Stand?
Some fundamental issues in the controversy about the appropriate monetary and
fiscal policy can be illustrated in terms of the Phillips curve; in fact, this is
another way of looking at the long-term problems mentioned in the previous chap-
ter. Since we cannot observe the Phillips curve directly, we may use the actual
combinations of unemployment and inflation as proxies for one curve or several
curves valid for a (possibly limited) period of time. In none of the countries do we
find the postulated negative relationship, at least not for the entire observation
period (Graph 7). Instead, the long-run curve seems to be even positively sloped
if we concentrate on the 1960s and 1970s alone, but there is no clear-cut movement
along one curve. In some cases (the United States, West Germany, the United
Kingdom) we can observe Phillips loops, i.e., there is no unidirectional relation-
ship. The 1980s again seem to tell a different story: inflation has been cut drasti-
cally, unemployment has increased, and, at least in Western Europe, has remained
high. This seems to validate the hypothesis of a negative slope of the Phillips
curve for practically all European countries. The tradeoff is more favorable for
low-inflation countries (West Germany, the Netherlands) than for - formerly - high
inflation countries. But it can also be put the other way around: the costs of a
one-percent reduction of inflation in terms of more unemployment were relatively
high in West Germany and the Netherlands. The curve looks a lot different for the
United States and Japan, where unemployment today is only slightly or not at all
higher than it was ten years ago. In the United States, the recovery after 1982
has led to a substantial reduction of unemployment. In Western Europe, average
unemployment increased from one cycle to the next.
Of course, we cannot know which Phillips curve is valid for the late 1980s. It
seems that the curves have shifted over time, and they may move again. Those
who propose more expansionary monetary and fiscal policies must identify substan-
tial slack in the economies of Western Europe. For the sake of the discussion, let
us take the example of West Germany, because this is usually the country singled
out on an international level to stimulate demand. What could we expect if West
Germany were to follow the proposals?20
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- Would we get a substantial reduction of unemployment?
- If so, would this reduction be accompanied by constant or rising inflation?
- Hence, could we expect a possible movement toward lower unemployment to be
permanent?
These are hard questions, but they need answering because depending on the
answer policy conclusions may be quite different. For example, if unemployment
can be reduced without accelerating inflation (a flat Phillips curve with present
unemployment rate well above the NAIRU), expansionary policies promise a free
lunch. Nobody would deny that such a development would be in the self-interest of
West Germany. If costs are involved in terms of higher inflation (negatively-sloped
Phillips curve), one would have to discuss whether it would be worth it; to be
sure, the case for expansion could still be made, but risks are involved. Above
all, will unions and workers accept a permanent fall in real wages through inflation
on which they do not agree when they negotiate about wage contracts? And will
savers supply capital at lower real interest rates? It can, of course, be argued
that, while we do not know how inflation will behave, the risk is well worth
taking (1) because the alternative of "doing nothing" does not promise any
improvement. But then, the third question becomes relevant: can we be sure that
we really gain something in the long run, or will we just get a short-lived boost
and end up with higher unemployment again and possibly higher inflation rates
(positively-sloped Phillips curve)? We certainly do not know all the answers, but
we can utilize the experience and use it to make our judgement. Four observations
are important:
(i) If we connect the observations of the early 1970s with those of the present,
we seem to get a negatively-sloped curve. But this is misleading because we
have moved only in one direction, namely toward higher unemployment.
Thus, we do not have one episode in which unemployment actually declined
markedly, or in which we moved along that (imaginary) curve in the other
direction. It is by no means clear that the process can be reversed.
(ii) It seems implausible that an economy can experience seven years of
substantial slack, i.e., a permanent excess supply. Prices are certainly not
that rigid in an open economy, and the Keynesian hypothesis of downward
(1) Those holding the hypothesis of hysteresis or efficiency wages would argue
that a strong demand stimulus is indeed a highly effective way because they
assume that a substantial slack exists.24
rigidity of wages cannot explain these observations, either, because we have
had substantial - and even rising - increases of wages in recent years.
Finally, the economies were not subject to successive negative demand
shocks.
(iii) Demand stimulation was tried in West Germany before. Starting in 1977,
monetary and later also fiscal policy became extremely expansionary. What
was achieved? The unemployment rate declined only slightly (by about half a
percentage point), and the price which had to be paid in terms of higher
inflation was substantial by historical standards. In fact, this experiment
was the main cause for the recession in the early 1980s following the experi-
ment of the locomotive strategy. This does not support the case for more
expansion through demand policies.
(iv) The observations rather reveal that the unemployment rate hovered around a
certain level for many years. Up to the early 1970s, the average unemploy-
ment rate was around one percent. It increased to some four percent in the
second half of the 1970s. Now, it has been around eight percent for six
years, and all forecasts say that it will stay there in 1988 and even 1989.
Similar movements can be observed in other European countries. From this
we must conclude that something has happened to the natural rate of unem-
ployment. Just as it was too optimistic in the late 1970s to expect that the
unemployment rate could be reduced to one percent (1), it may be as un-
realistic to conclude today that it just needs a demand stimulus to reduce
unemployment to more acceptable levels.
If it is true that the natural rate of unemployment has increased, other measures
than simple demand expansion are necessary - unemployment then is not a problem
for fine-tuning. So the debate should focus on the question which measures are
appropriate and necessary to achieve this objective. The following section deals
with this discussion.
(1) At that time, many observers were in fact talking about ample capacity to ex-
pand without any - or with only minor - danger for more inflation.25
2. Regulations, Minimum Wages, and Unemployment Benefits: Causes for a Higher
Natural Rate?
Since 1970, conditions in labor markets have deteriorated markedly in most Western
European countries. The first jump in unemployment rates took place after the oil-
price hike of 1973/74 and in the subsequent recession in the world economy. Al-
most nowhere in Western Europe did unemployment return to pre-recession levels
in the following recovery. Therefore, the level of unemployment was already high
by any post-World War II standard, when the second oil-price hike occurred in
1979/80. As monetary policy aimed at bringing down inflation, joblessness rose
once again to new heights. Thus, there was an upward-ratcheting of unemployment
with the rate of unemployment rising from one cyclical recession to the next.
The fact that unemployment remained high in upswing periods suggests that in-
sufficient demand, while being the initial reason for the increase in unemployment,
can hardly explain the persistence of high unemployment. When looking for the
basic causes of the labor market problems, it is necessary to take into account
wage policies as well as the development of nonwage employment costs. The latter
include the costs created by the many labor market laws and regulations which
have been tightened or newly implemented since the early 1970s. West Germany is
a case in point (1).
- Since the early 1970s, the labor market situation in West Germany has de-
teriorated markedly. In 1986, total employment was about one million (4 p.c.)
lower than in 1973. When the growth of the labor supply accelerated during the
1970s unemployment increased sharply. The unemployment rate rose from about 1
p.c. in the early 1970s to 9 p.c. in the mid-1980s.
- The West German labor market problems can be traced back to the change in the
policy regime that took place in the late 1960s and was worked out during the
1970s. The political change in 1982 did not lead to a reversal of the legal and
institutional setup that had been developed during the last two decades. After
the late 1960s, the government moved toward more interventionist macroeconomic
policies because there was widespread belief that a more active macroeconomic
policy was necessary to maintain a high rate of growth and full employment; the
(1) For an extensive discussion of this case see Soltwedel and Trapp [1987]; for
an analysis for many industrialized countries see Emerson [ 1987] .26
market economy was considered to be inherently unstable. In addition, the
federal government assumed responsibilities for industrial and regional develop-
ments. Furthermore, social reforms were implemented in order to achieve "social
justice" and "social peace" which were regarded as a preconditions for political
stability and for sustained economic growth. An outstanding element of the new
policy regime was the unconditional "full employment guarantee" which the
Federal Government declared at a time when the unemployment rate was below
one percent.
By taking over responsibility for full employment, the government increased
collective moral hazard of both employers' associations and unions. These groups
implicitly expected demand management as well as structural and social policies to
take care of any labor market problem. The great number of programs to sup-
port growth and employment since the mid-1970s, the increase in subsidies, and
the expansion of labor-market policies and of welfare benefits justified this,
assumption. Governmental interference enabled unions and employers to pursue
collectivistic wage policies that ignored the need for lower real wage increases
and for greater instead of smaller wage differentials in the economy.
The readiness of the government to tackle or to relieve employment problems in
combination with the monopolistic features of the wage bargaining system in West
Germany led to a pronounced real wage rigidity. Thus, the adjustment to declin-
ing sales and prices is concentrated on employment, the creation of additional
jobs through the establishment of new enterprises is hindered as these would
have to pay the same (high) wages as the already existing companies, and the
unemployed would not have the chance to find a job by accepting wages that are
lower than the contract wages. Where outsiders are able to endanger the bilater-
al cartel on the labor market, the government steps in to provide protection
against underbidding of insiders' wages by declaring the contracts also compul-
sory for nonpartisans. In those sectors of the economy where competition is
particularly fierce, where employment decreases, where companies are small or
are covered by collective agreements only to a relatively small degree - i.e., in
sectors with a strong tendency to undercut the cartel's settlement - contractual
wages and working conditions are extended to bind outsiders, too.
Comprehensive social policy measures added substantially to the cost of labor.
The share of fringe benefits in total labor costs increased from 43 p.c in 1966
to more than 80 p.c in 1984. In order to prevent companies from reducing
employment "arbitrarily" and "unsocially", protection against dismissals was27
intensified. In addition, labor law developed the idea of a "social property right"
of employees in their current jobs. Any significant production change or reduc-
tion of employment would lead to costly social plans in order to reconcile
technical progress with social targets. So it became increasingly expensive to
change the firms workforce via dismissals or via restructuring production fa-
cilities .
Contractual wages are minimum wages and welfare benefits draw the bottom line
for lower wage groups. By marked increases in welfare benefits relative to
earned income, the government has supported unions' efforts to push for
above-average wage increases for unskilled workers. The reduction of wage
differentials in combination with the legal and institutional setup of the labor
market has imposed severe barriers to entry for marginal groups of the labor
force. This has caused serious problems because the labor force was increasing.
While government interventions helped to enforce contractual wages as minimum
wages, thus preventing efficient underbidding by outsiders, labor market pol-
icies and early retirement schemes deliberately aimed at buying out labor at
existing wages in order to reduce the supply of labor. In addition, rather gen-
erous income maintenance schemes have implied considerable individual moral
hazard.
Due to the increase in government activities, the share of public expenditures
has risen from one third to almost half of GNP over the past twenty years.
Income tax deductions and social security contributions have risen correspond-
ingly. High marginal tax rates have provided incentives for outsiders not to try
too hard at underbidding in order to find employment in the official sector of the
economy but to escape into the shadow economy.
The increase in employment costs and the distorted incentives to work and to
invest resulted in a severe economic loss that is mirrored in the depressed yield
on fixed productive assets. Firms switched from investments in productive
capacities to financial investments and to direct investment abroad. The conse-
quence was a sustained slowdown in the growth rate of the productive potential
of the economy.28
IV. Policy Options
1. International Coordination of Policies: In What Fields?
There seems to be a consensus (of opinion) that international coordination of
macroeconomic policies is necessary to achieve national targets. It has been argued
that coordination is as self-evident as "motherhood"; it does not need discussing.
Apart from platitudes like "we are all sitting in one boat" or "we have to work as
a team", is the case for coordination really irrefutable (1)?
What remains undisputed is, of course, that coordination is appropriate in areas of
international public goods. Examples are the international legal order and the re-
duction of trade barriers. In these fields, the advantages are obvious. One may
wonder, then, why coordination does not take place, for example, in the field of
trade liberalization. The reason may be that - apart from strong influence of lob-
byists - governments do not agree on how to distribute the benefits among the
countries. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine that the summiteers cannot act on
something they all agree upon.
What about supply-side policy? For example, should the United States or the
United Kingdom have asked other countries whether they can reduce marginal tax
rates? Obviously, they did not, and nobody is complaining - not even those
countries which are experiencing a competitive disadvantage and which are losing
investment funds.
The present discussion is directed toward the coordination of monetary and fiscal
policy. Some critics argue that the case for coordination is not as obvious as it is
usually stated:
- The game-theoretic approach rests on the ignorance on the part of policymakers:
they do not know what foreign governments do and also do not consider the
effects of their own measures on the actions abroad. This behavior leads to the
(unsatisfactory) Nash equilibrium. It must be doubted, however, that politicians
really behave that way: do international organizations, conferences, summit
(1) For a discussion, see Scheide and Sinn [1987].29
meetings, and so on not have the purpose of exchanging information?
- The game-theoretic approach leaves out one important player, namely the private
sector. If private agents realize that a cartel is changing policy rules and is
acting against their own interests, they will adjust their expectations. For ex-
ample, if a cartel of central banks is established and this fact leads to ex-
pectations of higher inflation, coordination is counterproductive ("Rogoff pa-
radox") [Rogoff, 1985].
- All empirical analyses rest on models that focus on the short run. However, the
objective functions of the consumers probably do not have that time-horizon. In
the longer run, the beneficial effects of coordinated measures - as calculated by
econometric models - may be reversed, as even proponents of coordination con-
cede. Therefore, the recommendations given on the basis of short-run models
(e.g., in the case of overshooting exchange rates or with respect to the move-
ment along a Phillips curve) are not persuasive anymore.
- Policymakers who often use different models do not know the true model. Thus,
even if they have the best intentions, they agree on a coordination package that
may not deliver the expected results. Therefore, coordination can be counterpro-
ductive on these grounds as well [Frankel, Rockett, 1986].
- The case for coordination is made because policy instruments are assumed to be
scarce relative to the number of policy targets. The set of targets normally
considered includes external targets such as the current account and the ex-
change rate. Although changes in both these variables always affect more than
one country, coordination is not necessary in this area: exchange rates and cur-
rent account balances are the result of market processes, they therefore should
not be targets for government policies. After all, we cannot know whether
deficits or surpluses are too high or too low; the same applies to exchange
rates.
Apart from all this, what is the experience with respect to coordinated policies?
The locomotive experiment of the late 1970s, usually cited by proponents as the
example of good coordination, failed on grand scale. The failure of the Louvre
accord (of February 1987) was due to the fact that policymakers cannot know the
true value of exchange rates and do not know the true model - in this case, they
could not predict what course of monetary policy would be necessary in the coun-
tries involved to keep the exchange rate on the level they had agreed on before.30
2. Fiscal Policy: Competition in Tax Policies
Over the last twenty years, the - mostly unsuccessful - attempts to stabilize out-
put and employment by means of fiscal policy went along with a strong increase in
the public sector's share in total economic spending. On the one hand, the in-
crease in public sector demand relative to private demand has strengthened the
call for more government responsibility in managing overall demand and for more
coordination of demand management policies. On the other hand, tax evasion and
the growth of the underground economy have made it increasingly clear that the
financing of a larger government share, namely higher marginal tax rates, has
noticeably reduced the incentives to work and to invest. On a national basis, the
dampening effects on production and investment have been reinforced by the in-
crease in capital mobility since the late 1960s.
The recognition that taxation, among other factors, is a crucial variable determin-
ing a country's attractiveness as a location of production has revived competition
in tax policies. In this respect, the United States took the lead in reducing income
taxes and other countries followed suit. The measures ranged from a pure reduc-
tion of tax rates, a shift of the tax burden from direct to indirect taxes to the
elimination of tax loopholes combined with a reduction of tax rates. Competition
between national tax systems is the best way to search for the most effective tax
system in terms of achieving a high rate of economic growth and full employment.
Less successful countries can imitate the more successful ones and thus catch up.
At the same time, national economies are free to determine the amount of public
goods they want to produce and to fix the overall level of taxation accordingly.
The more successful a policy is in reviving economic growth, the more scope there
is for curtailing public expenditures and thus reducing the public sector's share in
economic activity.
3. What Targets for Monetary Policy?
Monetary targeting has gone out of fashion. In some countries, it has practically
been officially dismissed (the United States); in other countries, monetary policy
has successively failed to meet the pre-announced targets (West Germany). In31
part, the monetary authorities claimed that certain relationships had broken down
which before were reliable and could be used to gear monetary policy. This is
particularly the case in the United States and also in the United Kingdom, where
new definitions appeared and where the changes in the financial system have
affected the reliability of some aggregates. However, from this it should not be
concluded that monetary targeting is altogether useless. In most European
countries, where these changes have not occurred, the relationships still hold. It
has to be remembered that the correlation between money and various income vari-
ables have always been loose and not mechanistic. In Japan and West Germany, to
name but two examples, monetary expansion has been higher than announced, not
because of institutional or other aberrations but because of changes in the priori-
ties of policy: exchange rate targeting has - at least for some time - replaced
domestic orientation. In the United States, monetary policy seems to shift between
sustaining the recovery on the one hand and reducing the external deficit on the
other. To achieve this, the Fed sees its task in keeping interest rates low but not
too low which would increase inflationary expectations. This is not a viable
strategy.
All this reveals the uncertainty with respect to the problems of how monetary im-
pulses should be measured and what monetary policy should be directed at. It also
explains the search for new targets or indicators for monetary policy. Are the new
indicators suggested really good alternatives?
- The stability of an index of commodity prices is not a sensible target for mon-
etary policy, because it simply represents a subindex of more relevant price
indices. Why should the stability of commodity prices mean higher welfare? What
is important in a welfare sense is the stability of the purchasing power of
money. Also, the relationship between monetary aggregates and commodity prices
is certainly less precise than that between money and income. One of the reasons
is that commodity prices seem to be more sensitive to supply conditions. To give
an example: do the proponents of this strategy really want to tighten monetary
policy when there is a harvest failure?
- Interest rates are very poor indicators for monetary policy because one cannot
decide whether they are too high or too low by simply looking at them. The
relationship between interest rates and income is loose in the short run; in the
long run, they are positively correlated which means that a policy of lowering
"interest rates by liquidity measures cannot produce the desired results with
respect to real income or similar target variables. Furthermore, real interest32
rates can neither be observed nor be controlled by monetary policy. Approxi-
mations are, of course, possible, but the analysis of real rates must take into
account real factors and not only money. For example, if interest rates are
considered too high today, the conclusion does not have to be that monetary
policy is too tight. Real rates of return on tangible assets may have risen
elsewhere in the world and, due to the presence of capital mobility, there is
no way of isolating the domestic capital market from this. Finally, interest rates
themselves reflect expectations concerning future monetary policies: if interest
rates rise because economic agents expect more expansionary monetary policies,
actions to reduce interest rates will be counterproductive not only with respect
to interest rates; they will also lead to more inflation.
- The same shortcomings apply to exchange rates. A judgement about the price for
foreign exchange as being too high or too low requires knowledge about the
underlying equilibrium rate. No model on exchange rates can deliver this. If
market conditions are such that, for example, the D mark or yen appreciate
vis-a-vis the US dollar, there is no indication for the West German or the
Japanese authorities to loosen monetary policy. Such an orientation has
prevented isolation from inflationary policies abroad in the early and the late
1970s. At that time, the US dollar depreciated because of inflationary policies in
the United States, and interventions by other central banks helped to spread
inflation internationally. Finally, if exchange rates are also determined by real
factors, monetary policy cannot compensate for them.
Thus, these new suggestions do not promise to be good alternatives for monetary
targeting. Monetary policy may have to be redefined in several countries. Firstly,
monetary authorities should use an indicator which they can control; in many
cases, this would be an aggregate which is equivalent to the monetary base. The
broadly defined money stock (M3) the Deutsche Bundesbank has recently chosen as
a target is not appropriate for various reasons (1). Secondly, monetary targeting
does not mean that the target variable is fixed forever; in the case of deviation,
however, a monetary rule should enforce that the central bank reacts to
contingencies in a pre-announced fashion. Studies for the United States, the
country with the supposedly greatest uncertainty as regards to monetary
aggregates, have shown that a well-formulated rule would have substantially
reduced cyclical fluctuations and also would have delivered price level stability in
(1) For a discussion, see Institut fur Weltwirtschaft [1988, pp. 39 ff.].33
the medium run [McCallum, 1987]. This is more than an activist, discretionary
policy could achieve. The important element is precommitment on the part of the
central bank. Monetary policy should not shift priorities all the time or try to
maximize welfare on a period-by-period basis; instead, only precommitment can
guarantee policies with optimal outcomes in the medium run.
H. Exchange Market Intervention: More or Less Stability?
In the past three years, we have experienced strong interventions in exchange
markets. In part, these interventions have taken the form of "talking the dollar
down" and other elements of verbal attacks ("Baker-thy-neighbor policy"). But
there was also a substantial amount of buying and selling foreign exchange, in
particular after the Louvre accord of February 1987. Apart from these direct in-
terventions, monetary policy was to a large extent outward-oriented: at first, the
United States drove the dollar down by monetary overexpansion, and then tight-
ened in order to prevent a further fall. In Japan and West Germany, but also in
other countries, monetary expansion has been high because the authorities did not-
want the dollar to become too weak. International coordination took the form of
more or less explicit target zones for exchange rates.
Even proponents of the target-zone concept argue today that it would not be good
to try to fix exchange rates between major nations at present levels. According to
their arguments, the rates do not come close to their equilibrium levels. In partic-
ular, current account balances or, for that matter, the balances of the capital
accounts are not sustainable: they do not reflect the decisions of investors that
are warranted by long-run considerations. Surplus countries in East Asia and also
Japan and West Germany "save too much", the United States "borrow too much".
While the proponents' view is supported by recent developments, especially the
massive central bank interventions of over US $100 billion, target zones do not
promise to be an improvement even "at normal times". Over the past fifteen years,
we have been able to observe sizeable fluctuations of real exchange rates. These
changes have amounted to fifty percent or more between major currencies over an
extended period of time. Furthermore, current account balances have also reached
large values. One could, of course, argue that these facts demonstrate that the34
markets do not work properly, because exchange rates - for an extended period of
time - move away from "fundamentals". However, if we take the view that agents
who risk their own money do not behave permanently in an irrational manner, we
have to conclude that we do not have a model that can fully - in a quantitative
sense - account for the actual changes or even the fundamentals. What we do know
is that market participants react to news or shocks, and the best way therefore to
achieve more exchange rate stability is to avoid shocks, i.e., to ensure
medium-term orientation of national policies. Exchange rate stability is not
necessarily a desirable goal for its own sake, but it may well be a by-product of
stable economic policies. Blaming exchange markets for producing irritations is
misleading; instability is a symptom, not a cause of the problems.
There is also an inconsistency involved in the policies of intervention: on the one
hand, many countries complain about the high external deficit of the United States
or its slow reduction, on the other hand, they prevent one of the possible adjust-
ment mechanismus by keeping the Dollar high through their policies.
5. The EMS: Do All Countries Benefit?
The EMS was established to enforce coordination among member countries. In par-
ticular, the target was to reduce inflation rates in all countries, and to achieve
a convergence of inflation rates. Both targets have been achieved, although obvi-
ously not through the policy of coordination itself; OECD countries outside the
EMS were as successful or even more so, even the uncoordinated countries in
Western Europe. It is widely stated that the EMS was a means by which price level
stabilization could be "forced" on countries with a relatively strong "inflation
mentality"; the argument goes that those countries needed the imposition of dis-
cipline by the leader in that system in order to be able to sell the anti-inflationary
policy at home.
Now that the EMS has fulfilled this task, criticism - within the system - of a new
sort has emerged. Firstly, unemployment is now the most pressing problem. There-
fore, West Germany should pursue a more expansionary policy. Other countries
could not take the lead because they would have to fear devaluation. Secondly, the
fall of the US dollar has led to a sharp revaluation of the European currencies.35
While this may be warranted for the D mark because it is a relative close substi-
tute with respect to the US currency, it is not the case for other currencies.
Therefore, West Germany should - according to this view - reflate and revalue.
Thirdly, West Germany has built up a substantial - and growing - surplus vis-i-
vis most countries in the EC; in 1987, it amounted to some DM60 billion which is
almost twice the surplus achieved in 1985. Often, German policymakers are openly
reproached of pursuing a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
What should be done? Nobody can know whether the EMS currencies are strongly
over or undervalued. The only way to find out would be to let the exchange rates
find their appropriate levels. If the member countries do not agree on such a
solution, every country which feels that its currency has the wrong value is free
to change it. It is remarkable how strongly countries have resisted realignments
within the EMS that would just have equalled the inflation differentials, i.e., the
necessary devaluations would not have had an inflationary impact. However, there
obviously was competition in revaluing the currencies in real terms in order to
import price level stability. The dissatisfaction of some members of the EMS reveals
that cartels can obviously not deliver a combination of goods which is inconsistent
in itself, i.e., a fair price and a fair share for each member.
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